Maps provide a base for all intelligence operations and strategic and tactical decisions, supporting the planning and execution of all battlefield functions. The development of military mapping support in South Africa, related closely to the development of aerial photography, may be divided into five, sometimes overlapping, phases. The first of these phases spans the years from 1840 to 1930 and is characterised by the gradual recognition that aerial photographs could be used for mapping. Two major conflicts -the Anglo Boer War and the First World Warmarked this development. The Second World War is the key event of the second phase , which witnessed a rapid expansion of aerial photo coverage. The third phase (1945)(1946)(1947)(1948)(1949)(1950)(1951)(1952)(1953)(1954)(1955)(1956)(1957)(1958)(1959)(1960) saw the overemphasising of interpretation techniques rather than the analytical use of results, which was rectified during the fourth phase (1955)(1956)(1957)(1958)(1959)(1960)(1961)(1962) when the focus shifted to the applied uses of air-photo interpretation. During the third and fourth phases the topographic mapping support ability of the South African military was expanded. The fifth phase (since 1960) commenced with the expansion of data gathering and analysis into portions of the electromagnetic spectrum beyond the small visible sector. During this period the protracted nature of the conflict on the northern border of Namibia (formerly South West Africa) and the war in Angola focused attention on the South African military mapping system. The National Service system allowed for the expansion of mapping units and the thorough mapping of large areas adjoining our borders. Through all five phases, mapping in the South African military has advanced from hand-
Introduction
"Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army" Sun Tzu, 400 -321 B.C., The art of War.
1 "The tremendous volume of maps required by the armies of the world today leaves no doubt about their importance. Global war without reference to maps could not even be imagined, and in individual sectors the high mobility and speed of our new vehicles would be of little value without maps to guide them." 2 These scholars highlight the vital importance of topographic mapping support to an efficient military practitioner. If these statements were true in 400 BC and in 1944, they are even more so on the modern battlefield. Yet, before outlining the history and development of topographical mapping support in the South African military, it is necessary to describe the process of mapmaking or cartography.
Maps are a means of communication and a way to organise thought. Maps are created to transmit spatial information to its user and the success or failure of a map depends on its power to convey such information. 3 The process of mapmaking are best described as the stating of a spatial need by a map user (in our case the military practitioner), and the satisfaction of that need by a skilled professional (the military surveyor / cartographer) by depicting the problem area (battlefield) on a map. The completed product may then be used, and in using the map, new needs can be identified and passed to the cartographer. Maps, then, provide a base for all intelligence operations, tactical decisions and tactical operations, and support the planning and execution of most other battlefield functions. 
The Anglo Boer War 1899 -1902
While some of the earliest British surveys were made in Egypt after the battle of Tel el Kebir (1882), the Anglo-Boer War provided the main impetus for systematic mapping in the British Army. In 1899 the only available maps on the Boer republics were a few sketches of farms. The first Mapping Section, sent out in that year, comprised two officers, four NCOs and a sapper. By the end of the war, there were four Survey Sections and three Mapping Sections in South Africa. During the war Captain Charles Close (later Arden-Close) RE oversaw the first complete map reproduction in the field -the surveying, drawing and printing of the maps -by the British Army. 4 Several sources comment on the unavailability of accurate maps for the British during the War. Sir Richard Temple noted that "as to maps, there is the strangest misconception on the subject among many English people at home. Because maps exist in Europe it seems to be supposed that such things exist everywhere, or that if they do not exist the English Government can and ought to make them. Well, the English have managed to make maps of every coast, or almost every coast in the world; but when you come to make maps inland, that depends on whether the country is enemies' country or not. If, of course, the enemy has made maps for himself and published them, we can get hold of them; but if he has not, then he will not let us make them, and we must do without them when we come to fight."
He concluded that Paul Kruger and M.T. Steyn had not allow mapping of their territories by the British prior to the war and that this accounted for the poor maps available to the soldiers during the early phases of the war. 5 Temple of course did not mention that the British had done very little when the Boer republics were under British control.
Many references are also made to the inadequacy of the existing maps. At the Tugela, Sir Redvers Buller had to rely on a survey done by the Field Intelligence Department and on a micro-filmed map sent by carrier pigeon from Ladysmith. The blueprint bore the bold legend that "vacant spaces indicate that data is wanting rather At the outbreak of the Anglo Boer War the British possessed maps on a scale of twelve and a half miles to the inch for the Cape Colony, the Orange Free State and a part of Natal. These maps were issued to their army in South Africa. For the Northern part of Natal two military maps were available. These, however, were known to be inaccurate and hopelessly out of date. In January 1900 a thousand copies of a survey of Transvaal farms were seized at Cape Town, and maps were compiled from them by the Field Intelligence Department and sent to the front.
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On the Boer side, accounts regarding the availability and uses of maps differ from those of the British. According to many sources, the Boers used a system -in the first stages of the war, at least -of assigning Boer soldiers as close as possible to their home districts, so ensuring good local knowledge even in the absence of maps. Boer leaders, including such legends as C.R. de Wet, consulted with these soldiers, who briefed Boer commanders before battle.
11 Officers were instructed to improve their knowledge of the "quick drawing of sketch maps of the terrain". Although official sources do not indicate whether maps were used to plan battles and troop movements, the Boer republics were able to produce maps for this purpose: both enlist the service of joiners who were as familiar with the terrain as the opposing Boer forces in the field.
The First World War 1914 -1918
Although the necessity of a national mapping programme was discussed in 1904, this never materialised due to a lack of funding. The British War Office mapped the Orange River Colony at a scale of 1:125 000 and the north-west Cape at 1: 250 000, but not much mapping was done after that. 17 The Union Defence Force were on a scale of 1:20 000. Aerial photography therefore opened a new chapter in the history of surveying and mapping and was used extensively during this phase.
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In his article on Major J.G.W. Leipoldt, Van der Waag has also shed some light on surveying work done during and immediately after the First World War. During 1917 Major Leipoldt was called back from recuperative leave to survey and produce a topographical map of Saldanha Bay that had to be sufficiently precise to "allow the design of coast defences should they ever be required here" After completing this task he was transferred to Defence Headquarters as a first step in the creation of a small Intelligence Sub-Branch: the 'I' staff comprised Leipoldt and one non-commissioned officer. Their primary function was to gather intelligence inside the borders of the Union. Yet, despite the state of war, the Intelligence Sub-Branch spent an average of only £ 60.7.2 per month as at that stage the Union still received most, if not all, of her Intelligence from the British War Office. 
Between two World Wars 1919 -1938
After the war Leipoldt's small section was disbanded and no organised Intelligence existed in South Africa. In a 1920 report Leipoldt pointed out that the Union had no contemporary maps, road reports or reconnaissance surveys on the areas adjoining the border with Mozambique, and none whatsoever of the Portuguese territory itself. The report provided the impetus for the establishment of an Intelligence Section at Defence Headquarters in 1921 and of a national Intelligence Section in the office of the Chief of the General Staff on the 1 st of However vital transport was to success, roads and maps were of equal priority. With the accent on mobility, the vital importance of road and railway construction was obvious and called for survey support other than topographical mapping. When war began the only available maps were those made for district officers or by the Italians. All were grossly inaccurate, misplacing some geographic phenomena and even ignoring others. 33 These poor maps and a lack of reliable information on cross-country routes and water supplies handicapped operations. According to Orpen the captured Italian maps which were drawn from aerial photographs were also inaccurate and therefore of little use. The only map available for operations was an out-of date 1:1 000 000 series that was quite inadequate for military purposes. The official mapping of the area was therefore started on a 1: 500 000 scale using mainly data from Italian maps in addition to other sources. The 1 st Field Survey Company had trained geodetic and map production staff, enlisted from the goldmines of the Witwatersrand, as well as draughtsmen and instrument repairers who could take a reconnaissance plane's photographs and produce accurate maps without delay. 35 Army printers made speedy on-the-spot reproductions in their mobile print shops so that when the men at the front went into action they were supplied continuously with maps that were sufficiently detailed for operational purposes. 
The North African Campaign, June 1941 -November 1942
After arriving at Maadi, south of Cairo, the SA Survey Company commenced map production with Royal Engineer assistance and were assigned responsibilities all over the Middle East and North Africa, on a survey connection of Palestine, Egypt and Transjordan major triangulations. 40 Moving in a poorly mapped country, such as the Western Desert, where landmarks were rare, most units had great difficulty keeping track of their own locations at any given moment. At the end of each day the South African Engineer Corps' surveyors were probably the only men with a column who could accurately fix its position by means of an astrofix to within less than a kilometre in about an hour. With more time available, providing dust, clouds or rain did not limit visibility, this might be done more accurately. 42 Smith JR 1995 . Capt RS Webb ,RFA(1892 -1976 Army, the surveyors immediately began work on a considerable programme of map revision. Trigonometric control for the artillery on the whole Army front was in a bad state and affected the accuracy of the guns. Provision and maintaining of triangulation was carried out at such speed and precision that the accuracy of fire greatly improved. This was the beginning of a long period of most distinguished service rendered the Allied cause in Italy by South African surveyors and soon the highest authorities realised that no one but a highly qualified surveyor stood much chance of getting a commission in a South African survey unit. The standard of the ranks was also well above what was thought acceptable in British and American survey companies. The South Africans were primarily professional surveyors and not professional soldiers with some knowledge of survey and were far better qualified for intricate and accurate triangulation than their British or American counterparts, however good the latter might be at military map reading. The South African surveyors could cover the whole front more effectively than anyone else, identifying old or selecting new unmistakable reference points, and calculating their co-ordinates by survey for distribution to artillery and other units. They also prepared accurate maps from aerial photographs, updated existing Italian and other maps, and produced especially gridded aerial photographs for the Americans. The work of 46 Survey Company earned special appreciation, being amongst the first four recipients of the 5 th US Army service plaque and clasp "for excellence in discipline, performance and merit" in making surveys along the entire army front and absorbing the normal function of an American topographic battalion.
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The war in Angola
In August 1965 the first group of South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) insurgents entered Ovambo via Angola from Zambia. The South African Police and later the South African Defence Force tried to stem this growing tide and with the permission of the Portuguese government conducted cross border raids against SWAPO bases. In April 1974 the Portuguese government was ousted in a coup d'etat and a civil war broke out between the three Angolan freedom movements, União Nacional para Indepêndencia Total de Angola (UNITA), the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA). With Russia backing the MPLA, and the USA supplying the FNLA and UNITA with weapons, South Africa became involved in the civil war on the side of UNITA and the FNLA.
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During the initial stages of the South African involvement, the South Africans had no accurate maps and had to rely on xeroxed copies of popular road maps. The reason for this sorry state of affairs was that the Portuguese were for many years friends of the Republic of South Africa and there seemed no reason to obtain maps of areas under their government. Low clouds, thick fog and generally overcast skies made the use of aerial photography for map compilation extremely difficult.
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After a decision to separate the SAEC's surveys and mapping responsibilities from the Quartermaster General's printing function, 47 Survey Squadron under Major F.H. du Preez, was formed on 1 April 1975. The need for military survey and mapping of the SA Army at that time was to be satisfied by this Squadron. According to Orpen & Martin a Permanent Force nucleus was thus provided for a vital Sapper task which could become even more essential if the continuing "low intensity" conflict along the border should ever worsen.
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These three survey squadrons executed all future survey and mapping needs of the South African Defence Force. From 1975 the survey squadrons then became actively involved with survey and mapping tasks in Namibia and Angola. The lack of maps was overcome when usable maps of parts of the front used by the enemy fell into South African hands and were used by 47 Survey Squadron to produce, within 14 days, working 24 hours a day, a large number of maps of Southern Angola. Ironically, some of these maps never reached the front and were found in unmarked boxes at Grootfontein after they vanished during transport to the 51 Spies FJ 1989 . Operasie Savannha: Angola 1975 -1976 Spies FJ 1989. Operasie Savannha. pp 78, 103, 124, 158. operational area. When the South African invasion force of Operation Savannha withdrew from Angola in 1976, a total of 752 million rand was spent on the production and distribution of maps.
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During 1980 members of 47 Survey Squadron were deployed in Sectors 10, 20 and 70 at Oshakati, Rundu and Mpacha respectively. These field-mapping offices had the responsibility to annotate, update, reproduce and supply maps as needed by the territorial forces. The surveyors or cartographic draughtsmen were also responsible for the preparation of target sketches and target enlargements for use during the planning of operations. In April 1979, 47 Survey Squadron received its first annual intake of national service women, and though trained internally as cartographic draughtsmen, they were never deployed in the Namibian operational area. As from 1981 surveyors surveyed terrain for the building and upgrading of military bases at Okanguati, Omauni, Ondangwa Air Base, 203 Battalion and elsewhere. In 1984 satellite surveying equipment was used for the first time to determine the correct co-ordinates of all airstrips in Sector 10. The following year beacons were surveyed and built at all military bases for air photo control and navigation. These beacons were used to calibrate all mobile navigation equipment used by the South African forces for accurate navigation during operations. This navigation network was later extended to Sector 20 as well as southeastern Angola.
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During January and February 1976 as part of a feasibility study, the first terrain evaluation under military operational conditions in south-western Angola was carried out by two civilian scientists, Professor H.J. von M. Harmse of the Potchefstroom University for CHE (now Northwest University) and Dr D. Edwards of the National Botanical Institute of South Africa. This study confirmed the practicality of the system under operational conditions and also fulfilled the need for a rapid overall terrain analysis of the region. The culmination of this study eventually resulted in the formal establishment of a terrain trafficability troop under 47 Survey Squadron, but stationed at Potchefstroom, where graduate national servicemen were trained at Potchefstroom University as terrain evaluators and advisers. After the first national service terrain evaluation officers completed their formal basic and specialist training in December 1983 they were placed in the Citizen Force. Both officers and supporting troops served in the SWA operational area at the various field-mapping offices until the end of the war. In the absence of formal terrain intelligence maps for countries outside the RSA, and to assist terrain evaluators and the military, work also started at the troop in Potchefstroom on the 54 Spies FJ 1989. Operasie Savannha. pp 161, 312. 55 Prins AP 1992. Kartering (Unpublished manuscript on the history of the South African Engineer Corps). Directorate Documentation Centre, Pretoria. pp 2-3.
preparation of a series of reconnaissance scale terrain maps, based on satellite imagery of which the total area covered eventually culminated to some two million square kilometres. In 1990 Project Atlanta became a reality for 47 Survey Squadron with the acquisition of a nine million rand computer assisted mapping system. This, the first of its type in the country, placed military mapping right in front with its civilian counterparts in an era of digital mapping techniques, integrated with computerised surveying, as opposed to the conventional hand-drawn methods in use since the start of the century. (TACTIT), which was deployed operationally for the first time as part of the newly established South African National Defence Force's stabilisation force in Lesotho during May-November 1998, where it took full responsibility for all tactical mapping and printing requirements.
Technologically 4 Survey and Mapping Regiment has advanced from an organisation that produced maps by hand to a unit that renders mapping by means of highly modernised equipment. Some of the latest additions to the unit are the Global Positioning Systems and the Geographical Information Systems.
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Conclusion: into the next millennium?
The historical development of military topographic mapping in South Africa coincided with world-wide developments. The technological advances during each of the wars that saw South Africa participation can be clearly recognised. The South African military mapping support systems have come a long way since the inadequate maps of the Anglo Boer War. Today the South African National Defence Force have the ability to utilise the most advanced technology to provide military practitioners with the best decision-making tools available. The military can be rightly proud of the past achievements of its mapping units. The decorations these units received, the dedication with which they executed their tasks and the quality of products they delivered has done them proud. Without the mapping units the South African war operations would simply not have been as successful.
It is also imperative to learn from past mistakes. It is not known where technological advances will lead to in the new millennium. In less than ten years hardcopy maps, as it is known today, may be replaced by small, handheld, palmsized super computers with the ability to communicate with satellites, bringing the most recent terrain data to the soldier on the battlefield within milliseconds. Whatever the case, never again can the South African National Defence Force afford to downscale its surveying and mapping abilities during peacetime. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the military utilises much of its peacetime effort in the preparation of maps and the building of a topographic database of its areas of interest. The wars of the future will be fought from electronic maps that will be the visualisation of the digital battlefields. The present crisis in Northern and Central Africa and South Africa's involvement in peacekeeping operations there, are vivid reminders that the ability to supply soldiers with the best and most reliable maps possible, must be maintained.
It is only fitting to conclude with a quotation by Frederick the Great on the importance of good terrain information and reconnaissance. In his Instructions to his Generals (1747) he stated that "when it is desired to apply oneself to this essential part of war, the most detailed and exact maps of the country that can be found are taken and examined and re-examined frequently. If it is not in time of war, the places are visited, camps are chosen, roads are examined, the mayors of the villages, the butchers, and farmers are talked to. One becomes familiar with the footpaths, the depth of the rivers, the marshes that can be crossed and those which cannot… The road is chosen for such and such a march, the number of columns in which the march can be made estimated and all strong camping places on the route are examined". 
